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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Torts-Insulating Negligence in North Carolina
"Any effort to reconcile the North Carolina law on the subject of
insulating negligence seems futile."' A study of the North Carolina cases
on this subject at best leads one to agree with the somewhat kinder
criticism of Chief Justice Stacy that the problem "is usually fraught with
some knottiness."
2
The practicing attorney faces the problem of insulating negligence
when his client has received injury at the hands of two negligent parties.
The first party (hereafter referred to as the first tortfeasor) in most
cases has by his nonfeasance created a possible danger to the plaintiff,
e.g., emission of proper safeguards to warn of obstructions in the road.
In other cases the first tortfeasor may have caused injury to the plain-
tiff as a result of his active negligence, e.g., excessive speed. The
second negligent party (hereafter referred to as the "insulator") is in-
variably guilty of active negligence and his negligence is second in point
of time.
In a typical fact situation, the first tortfeasor abandons a stalled
vehicle on the highway at night, without adequate flares. The insulator,
with plaintiff as a passenger, travels at an excessive rate of speed and
fails to see the stalled vehicle in time to avoid a collision. Even though
both parties are negligent and both therefore wrong the plaintiff, the
probable result in North Carolina would be insulation of the negligence
of the first tortfeasor by the negligence of the insulator, and consequent
release of the first torifeasor from liability to the plaintiff. Thus, un-
fortunately for the injured plaintiff, a party contributing to his injury
is relieved of liability.
It would of couse be unrealistic to expect the law to be so well de-
fined that an attorney could look at a set of facts and tell at a glance
whether the court will rule that the negligence of the first tortfeasor is
insulated, but it is contended that an attorney should be able to predict
with reasonable certainty which rationale the court will pursue. There-
fore, it is the purpose of this note to resolve to some degree of predicta-
bility the course of reasoning which the court will follow in a given
set of operative facts.
Cases of Passive Negligence on the Part of the First Torfeasor and
Active Negligence on the Part of the Insulator
Clearly the most lenient case for the plaintiff who is attempting to
hold the first tortfeasor for damages was the early case of White v.
Carolina Realty Co.,3 where the first tortfeasor's truck was negligently
1 Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 699 (E. D. N. C. 1954).
2 Butner v. Spease, 217 N. C. 82, 85, 6 S. E. 2d 808, 810 (1940).
182 N. C. 536, 109 S. E. 564 (1921).
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parked at an intersection. - There was evidence of fog and also evidence
of negligence on the part of the alleged insulator, who, with plaintiff a
passenger, collided with the first tortfeasor's truck. The court held
that the first tortfeasor could not be released from liability "if any de-
gree, however small, of the causal negligence, or that without which the
injury would not have occurred, be attributable to the defendant . . .
because the defendant cannot be excused from liability unless the total
causal negligence, or proximate cause be attributable to another or
others." 4 This case is often quoted and was held controlling in two early
cases.8 Although the court has ceased to be this liberal, it has re-
quired that the trial court must charge the jury that the second actor's
negligence must totally supersede the negligence of the first tortfeasor
as the proximate cause of injury in order to insulate, relying on the
White case as the authority.6
It is submitted that the court reached the logical result in the White
case in that it would not allow "two wrongs to make a right" by re-
fusing to release the first tortfeasor from liability to the plaintiff. How-
ever, on facts similar to the White case-(1) the evidence revealing
that the first tortfeasor has by his nonfeasance created a possible danger
to the plaintiff, and (2) there being no evidence that ths peril was
recognized by the insulator or any other party similarly situated as the
insulator-the court has in the majority of the later cases insulated the
first tortfeasor's passive negligence and deemed the insulator's con-
duct active negligence subsequently operating. To understand this
position it is necessary to review the line of decisions giving rise to this
rationale.
In Herman v. Atlantc Coast Line R.R.,7 where the plaintiff's evi-
dence of the speed of the insulator's automobile revealed that his negli-
gence was gross and palpable, the court introduced the works of Wharton
on Negligence8 as being pertinent: "I am negligent on a particular
subject matter. Another person, moving independently, comes in and,
either negligently or maliciously, so acts as to make my negligence in-
jurious to a third person. If so, the person so intervening acts as a
Id. at 538, 109 S. E. at 565.
Earwood v. Southern Ry., 192 N. C. 27, 30, 133 S. E. 180, 181 (1926) (evi-
dence of excessive speed of first tortfeasor's locomotive and evidence of no warning
signals at railroad crossing; insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of exces-
sive speed); Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 431,' 130 S. E. 5, 6 (1925) .(first
tortfeasor left culvert open, unguarded, and without warning lights; insulator, with
plaintiff a passenger, guilty of excessive speed).
' Rattley v. Powell, 223 N. C. 134, 136, 25 S. E. 2d 448, 450 (1943) ; Hanes v.
Southern Public Utilities Co., 191. N. C. 13, 19, 131 S. E. 402, 405 (1926).
1197 N. C. 718, 150 S. E. 361 (1929) (First tortfeasor was a railroad com-
pany. There was omission of warning signals at crossing. Insulator's car, with
plaintiff a passenger skidded 90 feet before the collision and plaintiff's own wit-
ness testified it "hit and reared up like a bucking horse"')
8 WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE 138 (1874).
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nonconductor and insulates my negligence. . . ." The court also quoted
from the opinion of Justice Strong in the leading United States Supreme
Court case of Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg'° as applying the
same rule, seemingly emphasizing Justice Strong's requirement of a
definite causal connection, without comment on his oft-quoted require-
ment that the injury "ought to have been foreseen in the light of the
attending circumstances."". In Hinnant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
12
the Herman case was cited as standing for the rule that the first tort-
feasor is not required to foresee the negligence of the insulator where
the latter's negligence in palpable and gross.'3  Subsequently, the
Herman and Hinnant cases were used as authority for the cryptic state-
ment, "In any event, the negligence of the defendant [first tortfeasor] if
any, was only passive, while that of the driver of the automobile [in-
sulator] was active, and must be regarded as the sole, proximate cause
of the plaintiff's intestate's death."'14 The court in Haney v. Lincolnton'5
gave Wharton and Justice Strong as the authorities on insulating negli-
gence without extra comment and actually decided the case with the
statement: "This doctrine of insulating the conduct of one, even when
it amounts to inactive negligence, by the intervention of the active neg-
ligence of a responsible third party, has been applied in a number of
cases,"'16 and cited the above line of cases. The Haney case set the
stage for the pat decisions that where the negligence of the first tort-
feasor was passive and would have done no injury to the plaintiff but
for the subsequent active act of the insulator, the first tortfeasor's neg-
ligence is insulated. In these cases, the court quotes from Wharton and
Strong, but gives only cursory reference, if any, to the latter authority's
requirement of foreseeability.17
'Herman v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., supra note 7 at 719, 150 S. E. at 362.
1 94 U. S. 469, 475 (1876).
12 Ibid.
12202 N. C. 489, 493, 163 S. E. 555, 557 (1932) (first tortfeasor a railroad com-
pany; visible railroad crossing sign at top of hill; no warning signals of approach-
ing train; insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of excessive speed).
"2 Rattley v. Powell, 223 N. C. 134, 136, 25 S. E. 2d 448, 450 (1943) expressly
overruled any inference that might be drawn from the Herman case, slepra note 7,
that the negligence of the insulator must be palpable and gross in order to insulate
the first tortfeasor's negligence.
"4 Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. RL, 205 N. C. 329, 333, 171 S.E. 342, 344
(1933) (first tortfeasor a railroad company, negligence consisted of failure to light
stone pillar in middle of underpass beneath railroad's tracks; insulator asleep at
wheel with plaintiff a passenger).
1 207 N. C. 382, 176 S. E. 573 (1934) (first tortfeasor a municipality, negligently
failed to light intersection to show where street ended; insulator, with plaintiff a
passenger, failed to make proper turn and went into ravine at end of street) ; Note,
13 N. C. L. Rzv. 245 (1935).
"Id. at 287, 176 S. E. at 576.
'
T Goodwin v. Nixon, 236 N. C. 632, 642, 74 S. E. 2d 24, 31 (1953) ; Clark v.
Lambeth, 235 N. C. 578, 584, 70 S. E. 2d 828, 832 (1952); Smith v. Sink, 211
N. C. 725, 728, 192 S. E. 108, 109 (1937).
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Three cases which fall into this category but where the foreseeability
rationale was applied can possibly be distinguished upon the facts. In
Beach v. Patton,I8 the plaintiff was standing on the shoulder of the road
when hit by the insulator. There the court reasoned that "to hold that
the defendant Riddick [first tortfeasor] owed the duty to plaintiff's in-
testate to foresee that a third person would operate a car in such a neg-
ligent manner as to be compelled to drive out onto the shoulder of the
highway in order to avoid a collision with a car [first tortfeasor's]
parked on the opposite side thereof, [italics supplied] and thereby strike
a person standing on the shoulder would not only 'practically stretch
foresight into omniscience' . . . but would, in effect, require the anticipa-
tion of 'whatsoever shall come to pass.' We apprehend that the legal
principles by which individuals are held liable for their negligent acts
impose no such far-seeing and all-inclusive duty."'19 In the other two
cases where the theory of the Haney case was not applied,2 0 the first
tortfeasor had clearly by his nonfeasance created a hazard. There were
no lights or warnings of any kind and no conclusive evidence that other
persons similarly situated as the insulator had seen the hazard. It was
held that injury under such circumstances was foreseeable and the first
tortfeasor was not released from liability. It is suggested that the facts
of these two cases were such that injury was not merely foreseeable but
was most probable.
The court has invariably approved insulation where the circum-
stances reveal that a person similarly situated as the insulator has recog-
nized the possible danger, and the insulator, for such reasons as failure
to keep a proper lookout, negligently attempting to pass, or excessive
speed, failed to recognize the danger in time to avoid the collision. In
the leading case on this type of collision, Powers v. Sternberg,21 Chief
Justice Stacy drew on a Pennsylvania case22 for his authority: "Where
a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger
created by the original torifeasor, and thereafter by an independent act
of negligence, brings about an accident, the first tortfeasor is relieved of
liability, because the condition created by him was merely a circum-
18208 N. C. 134, 179 S. E. 446 (1935).
LO Id. at 136, 179 S. E. at 448.
"Price v. City of Monroe, 234 N. C. 666, 6 S. E. 2d 283 (1951) (first tort-
feasor had no lights whatsoever to warn of open ditch across city street; insulator,
with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of failure to keep a proper lookout) ; Gold. v.
Kiker, 216 N. C. 511, 5 S. E. 2d 548 (1939) (first tortfeasor a construction com-
pany; omission of duty to warn by lights that bridge was 4 feet narrower than
highway; insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of failure to keep a proper
lookout).
21213 N. C. 41, 195 S. E. 88 (1938) (The first tortfeasor's truck was parked
partially in the insulator's line of traffic. The road was icy and there were sev-
eral other cars parked off the highway on the shoulder of the road. The insulator,
With plaintiff a passenger, was guilty of excessive speed.)
"Kline v. Moyer and Albert, 325 Pa. 357, 364, 191 Atl. 43, 46 (1937).
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stance of the accident and not its proximate cause."'23 This requirement
does not seem to be one of actual awareness but constructive knowledge
is sufficient-"Every appearance indicated that he was running into a
zone of danger which he [the insulator] must have seen. Others saw
it, if he did not." 24 Therefore, "His was not the 'normal response' of a
reasonably prudent' man to the circumstances as they appeared." 2 The
ultimate issue in these cases seems to be the court's interpretation of the
duty owed to the plaintiff. If the evidence reveals that the danger
created by the first tortfeasor has been recognized by a person in a
similar position as the insulator, then the first tortfeasor's duty to the
plaintiff is fullfilled because the insulator is in a sense contructively aware
of the danger and can cause injury to the plaintiff only by an independent
act of negligence.
26
Where it is clear that the insulator has become actually aware of the
potential danger caused by the first tortfeasor and has then negligently
gone forward into the recognized zone of danger, the court has sustained
a demurrer, 27 or entered a nonsuit on the pleadings, 2 even before the
Sternberg case.
Where there was no evidence of gross negligence on the part of the
insulator or no evidence that a person similarly situated as the insulator
recognized the possible peril, or no evidence that the insulator recognized
the danger and then negligently went forward into the zone of danger,
the court has applied the doctrine of concurrent negligence. This was
the view taken by a federal court in North Carolina,2 9 relying on the
following principle from Caulder v. Gresham:30 "Where the second actor
does not become apprised of such danger until his own negligence added
2 Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N. C. 41, 44, 195 S. E. 88, 90 (1938).
2, Id. at 43, 195 S. E. at 89.
25Id. at 44, 195 S. E. at 90.
21 Smith v. Grubb, 238 N. C. 665, 78 S. E. 2d 598 (1953) ; McLaney v. Motor
Freight Inc., 236 N. C. 714, 74 S. E. Zd 36 (1953) (The first tortfeasor's truck
was parked in insulator's line of traffic. Insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, was
following a preceding vehicle too closely and failed to see the parked truck after
the preceding vehicle pulled out to the left to avoid hitting the parked truck.) ;
Reeves v. Staley, 220 N. C. 573, 584, 18 S. E. 2d 239, 247 (1942) ("Further, the
evidence shows that every appearance indicates that Saxton [insulator] was run-
ning his Ford into a zone of danger which he should have seen, and which others
similarly situated did see, if he did not, and that he failed to see the obvious.");
Murray v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N. C. 392, 11 S.E. 2d 326 (1940).
:7 Peoples v. Fulk, 220 N. C. 635, 18 S. E. 2d 147 (1942).
'George v. Atlanta and Charlotte Airline Ry., 207 N. C. 457, 177 S. E. 324
(1934) (The complaint alleged in effect that upon observing the oncoming loco-
motive, the insulator then negligently attempted to cross the tracks.) ; Ballinger
v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928).
"9 Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 699 (E. D. N. C. 1954)
(First tortfeasor parked mail truck in insulator's line of traffic with improper
flares. Insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, did not see the mail truck in time
to avoid colliding with it. There was no conclusive evidence of excessve speed
on the part of the insulator.)
-- 224 N. C. 402, 404, 30 S. E. 2d 312, 313 (1944).
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to that of the existing perilous condition, has made the accident inevita-
ble, the negligent acts of the two tortfeasors are contributing causes and
proximate factors in the happening of the accident and impose liability
upon both of the guilty parties."
Cases of Active Negligence on the Part of Both the First Tortfeasor and
the Insulator
A typical example of the cases where both parties are actively neg-
ligent is where the first torifeasor is traveling at excesive speed and
the insulator suddenly comes out of a side road without stopping at a
stop sign. The court is more apt to emphasize the foreseeability aspect
of insulating negligence in such situations. The leading case on the
requisite of foreseeability is Harton v. Forest City Telephone Co.31 where
the "test ... is whether the intervening act and resultant injury is one
that the author of the primary negligence could have reasonably fore-
seen and expected.13 2  This test plus the application of Justice Strong's
ruling in the Kellogg case resulted in the holding of Butner v. Spease:3
"It does not appear that the collision ... was the natural and probable
consequence of Butner's [first torifeasor] negligence, or wrongful act, or
that it ought to have been foreseen in the exercise of reasonable prevision
or in the light of the attending circumstances."3 4  In the Butner case
the insulator suddenly turned across the path 'of the automobile of the
first tortfeasor, whose negligence consisted of excessive speed. The
Butner case has also been relied upon for overruling the requirement
that the insulator's negligent conduct must be palpable and gross, "the
test is not to be found merely in the degree of negligence of the inter-
vening agency, but in its character-whether it is of such extraordinary
nature as to be unforeseeable."35'
This foreseeability doctrine was applied again in Warner v. Lazarus,3 6
"In the light of the circumstances disclosed by this record, we do not
think the driver of the Lazarus car [first tortfeasor] 'ought to have fore-
seen in the exercise of reasonable prevision' that the plaintiff or some
other person might be injured as a result and probable consequence of
her act in slowing down her car."' 7
-1 141 N. C. 455, 54 S. E. 299 (1906).
"Id. at 463, 54, S. E. at 302.
33217 N. C. 82, 6 S. E. 2d 808 (1940).
3 Id. at 89, 6 S. E. 2d at 812.
" Rattley v. Powell, 223 N. C. 134, 136, 25 S. E. 2d 448, 450 (1943). See
note 13 supra.
-229 N. C. 27, 47 S. E. 2d 496 (1948) (The first tortfeasor slowed down
rapidly as she approached a parked car where plaintiff was changing a tire. The
plaintiff and his car were completely off the highway. The insulator was following
the first tortfeasor. The insulator's regular brakes were defective and he applied
his handbrakes to avoid hitting the first tortfeasor, thus skidding off the highway
into the plaintiff.)
3T Id. at 31, 47 S. E. 2d at 499, relying on Butner v. Spease, supra note 33;
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It can be said that, as to the collision between two active tortfeasors,
the court will very probably rely upon the foreseeability doctrine of
Butner v. Spease and insulate the negligence of the first tortfeasor if the
negligence of the insulator is so extraordinary as to be unforeseeable, or
if the negligence of the first tortfeasor would not reasonably of itself
tend to bring harm to the plaintiff or others.
Where the negligence of the first tortfeasor has continued to be a
causal factor in the ultimate injury to the plaintiff, i.e., beyond the point
of the original collision (between the two tortfeasors), the court has
arrived at refreshing consistency in holding that the first tortfeasor is
not relieved from liability to the plaintiff,88 reasoning that "the super-
seding act must so intervene as to exclude the negligence of the de-
fendant [first tortfeasor] as one of the proximate causes of the in-
jury."39  Therefore if it can be shown that the first tortfeasor's neg-
ligence, i.e., excessive speed, failure of brakes or other essential safe-
guards, was the proximate factor in the first tortfeasor failure to avert
further injury to the plaintiff after the initial collision, it is reasonably
safe to assume that the first tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff will not
be insulated.
It is submitted that the court's variance in rationale will not permit
an ascertainable rule which will apply to every situation in determining
insulation,40 although it does reach a reasonable degree of consistency
when the decisions are viewed in the light of similar factual situations.
In the cases of passive negligence on the part of the first tortfeasor, and
active negligence on the part of the insulator, the court will very prob-
ably insulate the passive negligent act, relying upon either (1) the reason-
ing of the Haney decision that the passive negligence would have done
accord, Loving v. Whitton, 241 N. C. 273, 84 S. E. 2d 919 (1955) (First tort-
feasor did not have to foresee that the insulator would fail to stop at stop sign.) ;
cf. Hollifield v. Everhart, 237 N. C. 313, 74 S. E. 2d 706 (1953) (failure to frame
adequate causal relationship in the complaint).
" Alridge v. Hasty, 240 N. C. 353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954) (The insulator
turned across the path of the first tortfeasor's vehicle. After the initial impact,
the first tortfeasor's vehicle because of excessive speed veered across the road,
travelled down a ditch, jumped an embankment and struck the plaintiff.) ; Dickson
v. Queen City Coach Co. and Chappell v. Queen City Coach Co., 233 N. C. 167,
63 S. E. 2d 297 (1951) (After the initial impact, the first tortfeasor's bus, with
plaintiffs as passengers, veered across the highway and down an eight foot
embankment. There was evidence that the driver could have stopped the bus by
proper application of the hand brake.) ; accord, Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines and
Breeze v. Akers Motor Lines, 233 N. C. 160, 63 S. E. 2d 197 (1951) ; Mangum v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 188 N. C. 689, 125 S. E. 549 (1924).
"Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines and Breeze v. Akers Motor Lines, supra note 38
at 165, 63 S. E. 2d at 200.
,' Blair, Automobile Accidents in North Carolina, 23 N. C. L. REy. 223, 242
(1945) attributes to Justice Seawell this observation about North Carolina's ex-
perience in the field of insulating negligence: "the vacillation of the court ...
reminded him of the man who said his prayer was 'Lord, give me this day my daily
opinion and forgive me the one I had yesterday.'"
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no injury to the plaintiff but for the subsequent active and independent
act of the insulator, or (2) the constructive knowledge requirement of
Powers v. Sternberg. Where both the first tortfeasor and the insulator
are guilty of active negligence, the court very probably apply the fore-
seeability reasoning of Butner v. Spease and insulate the first torifeasor's
active negligent conduct if the act of the insulator is so extraordinary
as to be unforeseeable.
And yet, why the different tests for determining liability? Is it not
just as logical that a party parking his car on the highway without lights
should be charged with a duty to foresee that an injury might occur as
it is to charge a party guilty of excessive speed with the duty of fore-
seeability ?
We proceed upon two well founded principles of law; one, fore-
seeability is an essential element in determining proximate cause; and,
two, a negligent actor is liable for injury where his negligence is one
of the proximate causes of such injury. The court says, in effect, that
in order for the first tortfeasor to be relieved of liability to the plaintiff,
his negligence must be insulated as to the proximate cause of the injury.
We, therefore, arrive at the logical conclusion that in order for the first
tortfeasor's negligence to be insulated as a proximate causal factor in
the injury to the plaintiff, the alleged insulating act must be an unfore-
seeable act. Yet our review of the decisions has shown the foreseeability
principle omitted in some cases, paid mere lip service in others, and
emphasized as the test primarily where both the first tortfeasor and
the insulator are actively negligent, but even then confined, in the main,
to cases where the acts of the insulator were of extraordinary nature.
It is submitted, therefore, that the requisite of foreseeability should
be the test in a1l cases of insulating negligence.
HERBERT H. Tiaop.
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